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Abstract 
 
We add to the small literature on private school supply by exploring exits of K-12 
private schools. We find that the closure of private schools is not an infrequent event, and use 
national survey data from the National Center for Education Statistics to study closures of 
private schools.  We assume that the probability of an exit is a function of excess supply of 
private schools over the demand, as well as the school’s characteristics such as age, size, and 
religious affiliation.  Our empirical results generally support the implications of the model. 
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I.  Introduction 
 Research on private schools has largely focused on the effectiveness of private 
schools vis-à-vis public schools,1 the effect of private school competition on public school 
performance,2 and the demand for private schools.3  Little attention has been paid to issues 
associated with the supply of K-12 private schools.4    
In this paper we add to the small literature on private school supply by exploring exits 
of private schools. We find that the closure of private schools is not an infrequent event, and 
thus explore factors associated with the exit of private schools.  Specifically, we use national 
survey data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to study closures of 
private schools.  
Interest in the exit of private schools is part of a larger agenda of generating a better 
understanding of the supply side of the private school market, and of the nonprofit market 
more generally.  There appears to be an implicit assumption made in the literature on school 
choice that the supply of private schools will expand to meet the increased demand brought 
about from a voucher program.  However, there is little empirical work on which to base that 
assumption; Downes and Greenstein (2002) and Barrow (2006) are the only papers we are 
aware of that consider the supply response to market conditions. 
Beyond the more general interest in the market behavior of private nonprofit schools, 
the failure of such schools has policy relevance.  The sustainability of private schools is 
relevant for at least two reasons.  First, even if private schools are established, they cannot 
 
1 See Gill, et al (2001) for a review. 
2 See Geller, Sjoquist, and Walker (2006). 
3 See below for a discussion of studies focused on the determinants of the number of private school students. 
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provide an effective alternative to or competition for public schools unless they remain in 
operation.  Second, students in private schools that close could experience negative education 
outcomes.5  Furthermore, more knowledge of the entry and exit process for private schools 
will be important to policy makers and analysts concerned with the impacts of the expansion 
of vouchers programs.  
In the next section we draw on the existing literature to develop a framework in 
which to consider private school closures and to identify factors related to the probability that 
a nonprofit elementary and secondary private school will close.  In Section III the data are 
described, followed in Section IV by our empirical results.  A summary section concludes the 
paper.  
 
II.  Background 
 There are no existing theoretical models of the entry and exit of private schools.  
However, since most private K-12 schools are nonprofits, we rely on the nonprofit literature 
to motivate our empirical analysis.  There are many theories or models of the behavior of 
nonprofit organizations.6   These models provide little help in addressing exits from the 
private school market, and research on exits of for-profit firms provide little relevant insight 
beyond the findings that exits depend on market forces, including demand, cost structure, and 
 
4 Hotz and Xiao (2005) and others have explored the effect of minimum quality standards on entry and exit of 
child care organizations. 
5 We are unaware of any empirical evidence on this possibility, but student mobility has generally been 
associated with lower achievement (Mehana and Reynolds 2004; Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber 1996). 
6 Dollery and Wallis (2004) provide an extensive review; also see Salamon and Anheier (1998) and Malani, 
Philipson and David (2003). 
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competition.7  The only model we are aware of that explicitly considers entry and exit of 
nonprofits is Schiff (1986).  Schiff presents a general model of the response of nonprofit 
organizations to changes in demand and supply conditions.  Although the model is relatively 
simple, it implies that the nonprofits will respond to changes in demand and cost conditions 
via entry or exit in much the same way as in the proprietary sector.  This is consistent with 
Weisbrod’s (1988) observation that economic and political factors help explain why the 
average age of nonprofits differs across sub-sectors.   
We adopt a model that allows us to explore whether private schools should be 
considered economic organizations responding to demand factors, costs, and market 
structure, paying particular attention to the factors associated with the closure of private 
schools.  We thus hypothesize that the probability of an exit by a private school is an 
increasing function of the difference between the supply of and the demand for private 
schools in the market, as well as a function of school-specific factors.  If an excess supply of 
private school capacity arises, some of the private schools will face pressure to close, either 
because they cannot generate adequate enrollment or have to reduce tuition and thus have 
inadequate revenue.  Given the level of market competition, the probability of failure will 
depend on school-specific factors and characteristics, such as input prices, size, financial 
conditions, etc.    
We specify the model as 
 
7 Research on the exit of for-profit firms, for example, Mayer and Chappell (1992) and Bernard and Jensen 
(2002), focus on manufacturing firms.  Mayer and Chappell (1992) model exits as a function of profits, industry 
size, industry growth, and sunk costs.  Bernard and Jensen (2002) examine the deaths of manufacturing plants 
and focus their analysis on four factors: imports from low wage countries; firm structure and ownership; 
product market characteristics (in particular, whether the firm sells abroad and whether it produces multiple 
products); and plant attributes such as age, size and capital intensity, wage rate. There are several studies (e.g., 
Audretch and Fritsch 1994; Kangasharju 2000; Keeble and Walker 1994) that consider regional determinants of 
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where is the probability that private school i exits the market,  represents the existing 
capacity in private schools in the market in which school i is located,   presents the demand 
for private schools in that market, specified as a function of a set of variables 
Pr( )ie is
id
ix . The vector 
 represents school-specific characteristics and ic iε  denotes the unobservable factors that 
influence exit probabilities.  We are implicitly assuming that failure results from a market 
disequilibrium. 
Consider the factors associated with the demand side of the market.  Weisbrod (1975) 
argues that the demand for nonprofits arises when the government is unable to satisfy the 
demand for the public good for all residents.  He assumes that the government can satisfy 
only the demand of the median voter.  If there is substantial heterogeneity in the demand for 
public goods, then there will be unmet demand that provides a market segment that 
nonprofits can satisfy.  For education, heterogeneity in demand could arise from variations in 
income, wealth, religion, ethnic background, educational level, etc.   
Several papers address variations in private school enrollment. These papers, which 
include James (1993), Cohen-Zada (2002), Schmidt (1992), Sonstelie (1979), Long and 
Toma (1988), Hamilton and Macauley (1991), Husted and Kenny (2002), and Erickson 
(1986), generally consider only factors associated with the demand for private schools, 
implicitly assuming that supply will respond to demand.8  While the specific motivation for 
                                                                                                                                                       
firm births and deaths and find that the growth in local demand and the relative size of the small-firm sector are 
important factors.  See Caves (1998) for a review of this literature. 
8 Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) and Barrow (2006) are the only authors we are aware of who have 
directly addressed the issue of the supply of private schools.  While these papers are concerned with the number 
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each paper differs, all of the studies include one or more measures of heterogeneity, 
including the racial, ethnic, immigrant, or religious composition of the population.  The 
motivation for including such variables is that there is a commonality of interests among the 
families attending a private school, unlike public schools where the commonality is usually 
residential location.9  Religious affiliation is probably the most common factor uniting 
students in private school, but other uniting factors are possible, such as high scholastic 
ability, an interest in a special academic orientation (e.g., an interest in foreign languages or 
science), racial prejudice, etc. Thus, the size of the common interest group should be a factor 
in determining the survival of a private school.  These measures of commonality are 
consistent with Weisbrod’s “government failure” model.10   
All of the studies of private school enrollment (see above) include at least one 
measure of heterogeneity, typically percent Catholic and percent nonwhite.  We adopt these 
two measures and also follow these studies in selecting other variables for our demand 
expression.  The existing studies include measures of income and measures of the quality of 
public schools, typically expenditures per student and the pupil-teacher ratio.  We include the 
pupil-teacher ratio in our basic model.  The existing studies include a variety of other 
variables, for example, adult education level, family size, density, employment rate, poverty 
 
of private schools, the analysis focuses on demand side variables, essentially assuming that private schools will 
arise as a result of demand conditions.   
9 We consider commonality and heterogeneity to be the same thing since heterogeneity implies that there is a 
group with common interests that differs from the majority.  In an area where all families with school-age 
children share the same religion, one would not find the heterogeneity that might motivate the creation of a new 
school; there would be no common interest different from the majority. 
10 James (1993), for example, uses Weisbrod’s framework, along with limitations on the availability of public 
education, to explore differences across countries in the percentage of student in private schools.  Consistent 
with Weisbrod’s theory, she finds that larger religious heterogeneity leads to a larger share of students in private 
schools.   
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rate, and crime rate, some of which we include in our basic model and others we employ in 
alternative specifications.  
 Downes and Greenstein (2002) and Barrow (2006) are closely related to the current 
paper in that it considers private school start ups, in particular the location of new private 
schools in California and Illinois, respectively.  In addition to the standard set of demand 
variables such as income and public school quality, both papers include variables to measure 
the size of the market (i.e., number of students) and the existing supply (number) of private 
school.  We also include these variables. 
In addition to market conditions, we hypothesize that the probability of closure will 
depend on school-specific factors.  Studies of nonprofit closures typically incorporate the 
characteristics of the organization; quantitative studies of the closure of nonprofit 
organizations have generally used simple bivariate tables to relate closure rates to such things 
as age and size of the organization (see for example, Bowen, Nygren, Turner, and Duffy 
(1994) and Bielefeld (1994)).11  Twombly (2003) is an exception.  He used logit analysis to 
investigate the closure of nonprofits in the human resource sector over the period 1992-1998, 
focusing particularly on the effect of changes in state welfare policies on closure.  He finds 
that smaller nonprofits were more likely to fail, as were moderately aged nonprofits.  His 
findings are consistent with most other studies, which find that smaller and newer nonprofits 
are more likely to fail.   
Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002) summarize the arguments for why newer and smaller 
nonprofits should be more likely to close.  New organizations must rely on skills from 
outside the organization, which may be less committed to the organization than an internal 
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staff.  New organizations do not have established routines, so that a management problem 
becomes a major challenge.  New nonprofits lack long-standing ties with customers, lack 
reputation, and have less loyalty, all of which mean a lower probability of surviving a 
funding problem or the rise of a competing organization.   Smaller nonprofits have less 
financial flexibility to adapt to reduced financial support.   
There are also qualitative studies based on interviews with stakeholders that attempt 
to identify supply-side factors associated with closure.  Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002), for 
example, find that closure is associated with financial crisis, competition, burnout, program 
failure and loss of key personnel.   
Based on this literature we expect that smaller and newer schools will have a greater 
risk of failure than larger and longer tenured schools, for the reasons suggested above.  Of 
particular relevance for new private schools is the large initial financial investment required.  
At least initially, and probably permanently, operating expenditures will exceed tuition 
revenue.  Because a new school might not be able to initially attract a sufficient number of 
students or might not have sufficient financial resources to see it through the start-up period, 
new private schools are expected to have a higher probability of failure than existing schools.   
If a private school does not generate sufficient enrollment as quickly as planned, the 
school can continue to operate if it can find sufficient external financing.  If the parents are 
wealthy, they can potentially raise the funds necessary to continue to operate the school.  
Religious congregations are a major source of such funds, so that a church-related school will 
likely have more access to external funding and thus will be less likely to exit than other 
 
11 Twombly (2003) and Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002) provide references to these studies.   
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types of private schools.   Finally, schools that face higher factor prices, particularly teacher 
salaries, should be more likely to fail.   
 
III.  Data 
 The data set we employ to measure private school failure is drawn from the biennial 
private school surveys conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES); 
these surveys began in 1989. The data include information on certain characteristics of the 
schools such as grades served, number of students and teachers, religious or other affiliations, 
and the age of the school.   
Information from the most recent survey indicates that the number of private 
elementary and secondary schools is increasing.  According to Broughman and Pugh (2004), 
there were 27,223 private schools estimated to exist in the fall of 1999; by the fall of 2001, 
this number had increased to 29,273.  Their overview of the survey data also stated that the 
southern region of the U.S. has the greatest number of schools, with over 9000 schools, 
whereas the West has just over 6000 schools. 
 Full information is not available for every school responding to the survey and 
specific information regarding the closings of schools is not publicly available. We chose a 
random subset of 2,000 of the over 15,000 schools that answered the survey in 1989-90.  
Based on non responses to subsequent surveys, we identified about 650 schools that appeared 
to have closed by 2004. We then did an extensive search for each of these schools to 
determine which ones had, in fact, closed their doors.  The final sample indicates that 432 
schools out of 2000 closed between the academic years of 1980-90 and 2003-04.    
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Our sample is skewed towards survival relative to the universe of private schools. The 
15,000 schools that returned sample surveys in 1989-90 are probably not a random subset of 
the population of the approximately 27,000 private schools in existence.  Schools that return 
the survey could be somewhat more organized and better staffed than those that ignore the 
survey; these characteristics are probably correlated with survival.12  Note also that we code 
schools as closing only after they have failed to return three or more consecutive surveys and 
then been individually identified as no longer in existence.  Thus we are very conservative in 
coding schools as closing. 
 The private schools in our sample are of different types, including elementary-only 
schools, high schools only, and various combinations of grades.  Schools that offered 
kindergarten or kindergarten and first grade only were excluded from the original sample.  
We also exclude schools that appear to be home schools, that is, that reported having only 
one student.  The dependent variable is thus a dummy variable, denoted FAIL, which equals 
one if the private school closed during the period 1989-90 to 1999-00, regardless of the year 
it closed.   
Two basic issues must be confronted for the empirical model; how to define the 
geographic area for the market of the private school and which census year (1990 or 2000) to 
use for the independent variables since failure can occur any time over the period.  Following 
the approach of other researchers, we treat the county as the market area.  Although this does 
not perfectly capture market area, it seems very reasonable for elementary schools.  Of 
course some schools, e.g., boarding schools, draw students from well beyond the county in 
 
12 For example, detailed data from the state of Georgia indicate that the failure rate of private schools is around 
40 percent. 
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which they reside.  The second issue is the date at which to measure the independent 
variables.  We assume that school closing is the result of a disequilibrium in the market, 
which suggests that we measure market conditions at the beginning of the period, i.e., 1990, 
although there are some exceptions as noted below.   
Following the framework specified in equation 1, we measure supply, or market 
saturation, by the number of private schools in the county in 1990, scaled by the school age 
population (from the 1990 Census).  (Because demand is modeled as if we were trying to 
explain the percent of students attending private school, it is appropriate to measure supply in 
per student terms.)  This variable, denoted SUPPLY, is an imperfect measure of the supply of 
private schools.  A preferred measure of private school supply would be the number of 
private school seats that are available.  That information, however, is not available.   
 The modeling framework and the previous literature discussed in Section II suggest 
several variables related to the demand for private schools and school-specific variables that 
are expected to be related to the survival of a private school.  We include per capita income 
(from the Bureau of Economic Analysis), denoted PCI, and school age population as a 
percentage of the total county population (from the 1990 Census), denoted SCHAGE.  
If private and public schools are substitutes, demand for private schools should 
depend on the performance of public schools.  There is unfortunately no measure of school 
performance such as test scores that is both consistent across states and available at the 
county level that can be used to measure the quality of public schools. Therefore, we follow 
others and use the student-teacher ratio (obtained from the Common Core of Data from 
NCES), denoted STRATIO.  This was computed as pupil weighted averages for all public 
schools districts located in the county, as reported by NCES.    
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Heterogeneity of interests has been suggested as a primary driver for the demand for 
private schools.  Although there is no direct measure of this, various measures of 
heterogeneity have been used in the literature.  Cohen-Zada (2002) and most others uses 
percent Catholic to measure heterogeneity of tastes, while Clotfelter (1976) and others use 
percent black.  We include the percent of the population that is Catholic (from the Glenmary 
Research Center 1992; 2002), denoted PCCATH, as a measure of religious commonality.  To 
account for preferences based on race, we include the percent of the population that is non-
white, denoted PCNW.  
To reflect general economic conditions that might be associated with the financial 
condition of the private schools, we compute a measure of employment in the county, 
denoted EMP.  This is the number of individuals employed (from County Business Patterns) 
divided by the size of the adult (16 years and over) population.  We use the value of this ratio 
in the year prior to the exit of the school, or the value for 2000 if the school does not fail.  
Although this is not exactly an employment rate, increases in the value imply stronger 
economic conditions.  (The unemployment rate is not available for all counties.)  Our 
summary statistics show that EMP is higher, on average, in counties where surviving schools 
are located.   
Additional demographic variables that we include are: population density, denoted 
DEN, whether the county is located in a metropolitan area, denoted METRO, and the poverty 
rate, denoted POV.  The density of a county and whether a county is part of a metropolitan 
area could increase or decrease the level of competition among private schools.  For example, 
for private schools that are in a metro county, the competition they face likely includes 
private schools in the other counties.  On the other hand, the relevant school age population 
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(i.e., market size) could be larger than that of the home county.  Thus, the coefficients on 
these variables could be positive or negative.  Cohen-Zada (2002) suggests density is a 
measure of the cost of private education due to its relationship to transportation cost. 
It is possible that charter schools may be seen as very close substitutes for private 
schools.  Thus, as an additional measure of supply we include the number of charter schools 
in the county, as reported by the National Center for Education Statistics, scaled by the 
school age population, denoted CHARTER.  While we include this variable, unfortunately 
the earliest year for which the number of charter schools is available is 2002.  
We have several variables from the private school survey that pertain to 
characteristics of the private school.  Our data indicate whether the school is a religious 
school and gives the religious affiliation of the school. To measure the potential for funding a 
school, beyond the income of the parents, we include measures of affiliation with religious 
groups of independent schools, denoted RELIG.  RELIG equals one if the private school 
belongs to one of the Christian religious affiliations.  We also include a dummy variable, 
denoted CATH, which equals one if the school is a Catholic school. We also use dummy 
variables to distinguish between private schools that serve elementary schools only (grades 1-
8), denoted ELEM, or high school only (grades 9-12), denoted HS, and all other schools.13   
In addition, we measure the size of the school by the number of teachers, denoted TEACH, 
and by the size of the student body, denoted STSIZE.  Since schools that are about to fail 
may have suffered declining enrollments prior to closing, we determine the maximum 
number of teachers and student body over the period before failure.   
 
13 While most of the non-high school private schools are elementary only, there are a number of schools that 
serve all grades or some mix of high school and elementary grades. 
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We have no measure of the cost structure of the private school, so we use the average 
teacher salary for public schools in the county, denoted SALARY, on the assumption that 
higher public school salaries would force private schools to pay higher salaries.  We calculate 
this by dividing total instructional salaries by the number of full time equivalent teachers 
(from the Common Core of Data from NCES).  Finally, we consider the number of years the 
school has been in service, with the expectation that newer schools are more likely to exit 
than schools with longer histories. We define a dummy variable, SHORTTM, that takes the 
value one if the school has been in existence for less than 15 years. 
 Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics describing the characteristics of the 
private schools, statistics for public school and demographic variables are in Table 2.  
Beginning with the sample of 2,000 schools, we find that over the next twelve years, 432 
schools ceased operations. The tables show statistics for the full sample and computed 
separately for the schools that failed and those that survived.  There are some minor, but 
interesting differences in some of the demographic variables.  For example, per capita 
income is somewhat higher in the counties where the surviving schools are located. 
Similarly, the percentage of the population that is nonwhite is higher in the counties of 
surviving schools.  
There are more substantial differences in enrollment and faculty sizes, the failing 
schools had fewer students - an average of 168 compared to a mean of 326 for the surviving 
schools - and had fewer teachers – about 12 on average as opposed to just over 23. The 
sample contains about 28 percent Catholic schools and 7 percent Christian-affiliated 
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schools.14  Interestingly, none of the Catholic schools or Christian schools in our sample 
exited the market.  
Table 2 indicates that failing schools are on average located in counties with a lower 
population density.  Surviving private schools, on average, are located in counties with lower 
poverty and slightly higher percentages of Catholics in the population.   
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Because none of the Catholic schools or Christian-affiliated schools in our sample 
failed during our sample period, it was not possible to estimate a probit model that used 
Catholic school or Christian school dummy variables.  Instead, we estimate a linear 
probability model. Due to missing values on some variables, the number of observations used 
in the most general model is 1924.  Column 2 of Table 3 contains the results. 
Most of the private school characteristics variables had the anticipated effects on the 
probability of exit.  Schools that had been in existence for fewer than fifteen years 
(SHORTTM) were more likely to fail that those that had been around for a long time and 
computing SHORTTM with even fewer years increases the size of the coefficient.   This is 
consistent with our expectations and the literature on the failure of nonprofits.   High school 
only private schools were somewhat more likely to fail than other private schools.  We had 
expected that failure would be higher among elementary schools; it is perceived to be easier 
to start an elementary school, and thus we felt that these schools might be in a more 
financially precarious position.    
 
14 Schools are categorized as Catholic or Christian based on the school’s membership in associations such as “ 
American Association of Christian Schools“, thus it is possible that some independent Christian or Catholic 
schools are not included. 
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There are two measures of school size, TEACH, which is the number of teachers, and 
STSIZE, which is total enrollment.  We find that when both measures are included, larger 
numbers of teachers have a strong negative impact on failure probabilities whereas the 
enrollment variable has a very small, but significant positive effect on failures. This probably 
indicates that, given the size of the student body, higher numbers of teachers are a positive 
indicator of private school quality.  If the number of teachers is excluded from the model, the 
enrollment variable has a negative coefficient, as expected.  
The results for the economic variables were mixed.  The quasi-employment rate, 
EMP, had a strong negative impact on failure.  An increase of 0.1 in this variable (say, from 
0.54 to 0.64) would imply about a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of failure.  
The coefficient on per capita income, however, is very small with a large standard error.  Our 
results suggest that parents’ decisions to send children to private schools could be more 
responsive to perceived threats from an increase in unemployment than from a small 
decrease in income.   If EMP is excluded from the regression, the coefficient on PCI is 
negative, although it still misses statistical significance.  This result agrees with the 
descriptive statistics which indicate that counties where surviving schools are located have a 
slightly higher per capita income, on average, than do counties where failing schools are.   
The poverty rate, POV, on the other hand, has a small positive effect on failure, 
although this result just misses being statistically significant.  A one percentage point 
increase would increase the probability of failure by about 0.4 percentage points.  We 
initially anticipated that POV could measure heterogeneity, in that the larger the poverty rate 
in a county, the more likely it is that non-poverty status parents will send their child to a 
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private school. Our results, however, have the opposite sign; increasing poverty increases the 
probability of failure.   
The student-teacher ratio, STRATIO, measures public school quality; this variable 
consistently showed a strong negative relationship with the probability of private school 
failure, meaning that higher student-teacher ratios are associated with lower failure 
probabilities for private schools.  This provides some support for the notion that parents 
respond to quality aspects of public schools. 
The average salary of public school teachers in 1999, SALARY, was meant to 
approximate private school costs.  The coefficient on SALARY, although positive, is very 
small and insignificant in all models. One explanation is that in areas where education is 
highly valued, parents support both public and private schools.  School teacher salaries are 
high, but this is both a cost factor for private schools and an indication of preferences. 
Two variables were included to measure competition from other schools. The market 
saturation variable, SUPPLY, was computed as the number of private schools in the county 
divided by school age population.  This variable has a very small positive impact on the 
probability of failure, but the impact is not precisely measured. We also included the number 
of charter schools divided by the school age population as an additional measure of 
competition to the private schools.  The coefficient on this variable was so close to zero that 
it was dropped in most specifications.  There are some problems with the variable given that 
it is measured in 2002.   
Other variables that gave surprising results were the percent Catholic in the 
population (PCCATH) and the percent nonwhite (PCNW).  Models using these variables 
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never yielded significant effects.  This is a surprising result given that prior studies 
estimating private school demand have generally found an effect.   
As noted above, no Catholic or Christian-affiliated school in our sample failed during 
this period.  Because the market for religious schools may be different than for other private 
schools, we reran the regression reported in column two of Table 3 but excluded these 
religious schools.  For this sample, we estimated both linear probability and probit models. 
The results, which are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 are similar in terms of sign and 
level of significance for both models and with the results in column 2.  
Another alternative model that we estimated focused only on elementary schools; this 
is based on the assumption that the start up of elementary schools is easier than schools that 
offer all grades or high school grades.  Thus it seems more likely that there could be an over 
supply of such schools and that they may start on weaker financial footings.  Thus, we ran 
separate models for the elementary schools.  The results for elementary only are presented in 
column 2 of Table 4; these results do not differ essentially from the results reported in Table 
3.  
The impact of competition from other private schools might be obscured to some 
extent due to many private schools in our sample operating in counties where there are either 
no other or few other private schools.  In the original survey data on over 15,000 schools, 
there are 1500 schools operating in counties with three or fewer private schools.  To see 
whether competition has a stronger impact in places where there actually could be 
competition, we limited the sample to counties located in metropolitan areas (column 3 of 
Table 4) and re-estimated the model. The results are basically the same as those in Table 2.  
(We also restricted the counties to those with four or more private schools.  These counties 
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are essentially just metropolitan counties and thus the results are nearly identical to those in 
column 3.) 
We also estimated several regressions using alternative sets of the variables.  
Generally, these had no effect on the results presented in Tables 3 and 4.  It is possible, 
perhaps even likely, that heterogeneity has a non-linear effect.  For example, if a county is 
100 percent Catholic, there is no heterogeneity.  To explore this possibility, we included 
percent Catholic squared and percent nonwhite squared.  Neither coefficient on the squared 
term was close to being statistically significant.  
We considered alternative measures of public school competition, including 
expenditures per student and the drop out rate.  The instructional expenditures per student 
never showed a substantive or statistically significant impact on exit probabilities.  In some 
specifications, the high school dropout rate had a statistically significant positive impact on 
the probability of failure for private schools, which seems counter-intuitive.   
We included other control variables, including percent with a college degree, the 
crime rate, and the proportion voting Republican in the 1988 election.  None of these 
variables had any measurable impact on failure.  Further when these other control variables 
were included, the impacts of the primary variables were very similar to the results reported 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
   
V.  Summary 
This paper used national survey data from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) to study closures of private schools, events which occur with some frequency   Our 
model assumed that the closure of a nonprofit private school is the result of market 
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disequilibrium.  In particular, we hypothesized that the probability of an exit by a private 
school is an increasing function of the difference between the supply of and the demand for 
private schools in the market, as well as a function of school-specific factors.  We relied on 
the existing literature that attempts to explain the percent of students in private school to 
select variables related to the demand, and the literature on the closure of nonprofits to select 
the school specific variables.  The empirical results are generally consistent with results from 
the previous demand side literature as well as with our conjectures on the effects of supply-
side factors.  
A broader purpose of the analysis is to explore the question of whether the behavior 
of nonprofit private schools is consistent with a market model of non profit firm behavior.  
Our empirical model yielded results that generally support the market model of private 
schools.  However, the fact that none of the Catholic or Christian-affiliated schools in our 
sample failed suggests that market forces might not dominate for all private schools. 
 There is an implicit assumption in the literature on public school choice that nonprofit 
private school supply will respond to match any increase in demand generated for example, 
by a voucher system that allows parents to opt out of poorly performing public schools.   
Other than this paper, no one, to our knowledge, has tried to verify this empirically.  Our 
work is the first step in examining this assumption and our results provide some indirect 
evidence that most nonprofit private schools are market driven.   
 An important issue that our research only begins to examine is the reaction of private 
schools to public school quality.  Our results indicated that public school districts where 
student teacher ratios are high led to lower failure probabilities for private schools.  This 
evidence is indirect at best; longitudinal data on public and private schools are needed to 
 21
analyze the impact of changing quality in the public schools on the private school market.  
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics for private school characteristics 
 
Variables All Schools 
Mean 
(St. Deviation) 
Exit=0 
Mean 
(St. Deviation) 
Exit=1 
Mean 
(St. Deviation) 
 n=2000 n=1568 n=432 
Total enrollment 
STSIZE 
292.382 
(288.19) 
326.637 
(304.49) 
168.049 
(168.37) 
Total Teachers 
TEACH 
20.778 
(20.42) 
23.173 
(21.75) 
12.067 
(10.81) 
Years in service 
YEARS 
35.096 
(32.76) 
36.929 
(33.24) 
28.440 
(30.05) 
Catholic school 
CATH 
0.281 
(0.45) 
0.358 
(0.48) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
Christian school 
RELIG 
0.073 
(0.26) 
0.092 
(0.29) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
Number private schools 
in county/ school age 
pop  SUPPLY 
47.544 
(22.12) 
47.583 
(21.86) 
47.402 
(23.03) 
Elementary only 
ELEM 
0.640 
(0.48) 
0.652 
(0.48) 
0.595 
(0.49) 
High school only 
HS 
0.064 
(0.249) 
0.067 
(0.25) 
0.051 
(0.22) 
These variables are found in: National Center for Education Statistics, Private School Survey, 
1989-1990 through 2001-2002. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics, public school and demographic variables 
Variables All Schools 
Mean 
(St. Deviation) 
Exit=0 
Mean 
(St. Deviation) 
Exit=1 
Mean 
(St. Deviation) 
Data 
Source 
 n=2000 n=1568 n=432  
Student/teacher ratio 
public schools 1991 
STRATIO 
16.920 
(2.57) 
16.954 
(2.58) 
16.799 
(2.57) 
NCES,  
CCD 
Number charter 
schools/school age pop 
CHARTER 
3.740 
(6.33) 
3.765 
(6.38) 
3.651 
(6.12) 
NCES, 
CCD 
High school dropout rate 
DROPOUT00 
3.438 
(3.12) 
3.476 
(3.16) 
3.304 
(2.96) 
NCES, 
CCD 
Mean Salary teachers, 
2000  SALARY 
52,506 
(10302) 
52,660 
(11449) 
51957 
(9750) 
NCES, 
CCD 
School age pop 1990 (as 
percent)  SCHAGE 
17.990 
(2.31) 
17.975 
(2.29) 
18.045 
(2.40) 
U.S Census, 1990 
School age pop 
2000 (as percent)  
SCHAGE_2000 
18.814 
(2.01) 
18.809 
(1.99) 
18.834 
(2.07) 
U.S. Census, 2000 
Per capita income, 
1990 PCI 
14,998 
(3.549) 
15,069 
(3,512) 
14,739 
(3,669) 
U.S Census, 1990 
Per capita income, 
2000  PCI_2000 
22,213 
(5211) 
22,297 
(5185) 
21.907 
(5299) 
 
U.S. Census, 2000 
Nonwhite pop 
1990 (as percent) 
PCNW 
26.735 
(19.818) 
26.946 
(19.90) 
25.969 
(19.518) 
U.S Census, 1990 
Nonwhite pop 
2000 (as percent) 
PCNW_2000 
33.965 
(22.01) 
34.229 
(22.13) 
33.006 
(21.58) 
U.S. Census, 2000 
Percent Catholic 
Population 1990 
PCCATH 
26.315 
(15.52) 
26.405 
(15.29) 
25.986 
(16.33) 
Glenmary 
Institute 
Percent Poverty 
1990,  POV 
12.686 
(5.74) 
12.607 
(5.61) 
12.972 
(5.95) 
U.S Census, 1990 
Population Density 1990 
DEN 
2903.11 
(7422.6) 
3091.60 
(7819.2) 
2218.95 
(5713.74) 
U.S Census, 1990 
Employment Rate (one 
year lag) EMP 
0.535 
(0.202) 
0.547 
(0.205) 
0.493 
(0.185) 
County Business 
Patterns 
Metro Area 
METRO 
0.867 
(0.34) 
0.872 
(0.33) 
0.845 
(0.362) 
U.S Census, 1990 
 
Table 3:  Results from linear probability model and probit marginal effects 
 All schools Excluding 
Catholic and 
Christian 
schools 
Probit model 
marginal effects 
 N=1924 N=1239 N=1239 
 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(St. Error) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(St. Error) 
Estimated 
Marginal effect 
(St. Error) 
Private school characteristics 
 
SHORTTM 
0.080*** 
(0.20) 
0.1070** 
(0.029) 
0.1003*** 
(0.029) 
  
STSIZE 
0.0121*** 
(0.004) 
0.0094 
(0.008) 
0.0116 
(0.015) 
 
TEACH 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0109*** 
(0.002) 
 
ELEM 
-0.0411* 
(0.025) 
-0.0425 
(0.030) 
-0.0472 
(0.032) 
 
HS 
0.0626* 
(0.038) 
0.044 
(0.060) 
0.1026 
(0.075) 
 
RELIG 
-0.3335*** 
(0.0188) 
    - - 
 
CATH 
-0.3056*** 
(0.016) 
    -  - 
 
SUPPLY  
58.119 
(48.13) 
80.550 
(74.25) 
82.641 
(74.11) 
Economic conditions  
 
EMP 
-0.2448*** 
(0.060) 
-0.3515*** 
(0.084) 
-0.3619*** 
(0.091) 
 
PCI 
 0.0035 
(0.005) 
0.0042 
(0.007) 
0.0050 
(0.008) 
 
POV 
0.0035 
(0.002) 
0.0052 
(0.004) 
0.0054 
(0.004) 
Demographic characteristics  
 
PCCATH 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
 
METRO 
0.0428 
(0.031) 
0.0561 
(0.047) 
0.0700* 
(0.043) 
 
SCHAGE 
-0.0079 
(0.005) 
-0.0108 
(0.007) 
-0.0114 
(0.008) 
 
DEN 
-0.0068*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0090*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0110*** 
(0.004) 
Public school variables  
 
STRATIO 
-0.0109*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0175*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0201*** 
(0.001 
SALARY 0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.0011 
(0.002) 
0.0012 
(0.002) 
 
Constant 
0.6748*** 
(0.157) 
0.8204*** 
(0.225) 
 - 
2R  .21 .09  
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Notes:  Estimated standard errors are robust.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level.  Marginal effects for dummy variables are computed as the 
change in probability as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
 
 
Table 4:  Results from linear probability models, alternate specifications 
 Elementary 
schools 
Schools in 
metro counties 
 N=1230 N=1658 
 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(St. Error) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(St. Error) 
 
SHORTTM 
-0.0575*** 
(0.026) 
0.0730*** 
(0.022) 
  
STSIZE 
-0.0044 
(0.008) 
0.0126*** 
(0.005) 
 
TEACH 
-0.0055*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0007) 
 
ELEM 
 
- 
-0.0391 
(0.027) 
 
HS 
- 0.0624 
(0.039) 
 
RELIG 
-0.3063*** 
(0.027) 
-0.3231*** 
(0.020) 
 
CATH 
-0.3021*** 
(0.019) 
-0.3033*** 
(0.017) 
 
SUPPLY  
1.713 
(57.28) 
79.548 
(63.15) 
Economic conditions 
 
EMP 
-0.2110*** 
(0.074) 
-0.2290*** 
(0.066) 
 
PCI 
0.0000 
(0.006) 
0.0024 
(0.006) 
 
POV 
0.0022 
(0.003) 
0.0019 
(0.003) 
Demographic characteristics 
 
PCCATH 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.0008) 
 
METRO 
0.0622* 
(0.037) 
 
- 
 
SCHAGE 
-0.0098 
(0.007) 
-0.0085 
(0.005) 
 
DENS 
-0.0053* 
(0.003) 
-0.0065*** 
(0.002) 
Public school variables 
 
STRATIO 
-0.0132*** 
(0.005) 
-0.0106*** 
(0.004) 
SALARY 0.0005 
(0.002) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
 
Constant 
0.8049 
(0.198) 
0.7394 
(0.173) 
2R  .22 .21 
Note:  Estimated standard errors are robust.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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